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Using international data, we investigate whether the quality of industrial relations matters 
for  the  macro  economy.  We  measure  industrial  relations inversely by strikes  –  which 
proxy we cross-check with an industrial relations reputation indicator – and our macro 
performance  indicator  is  the  unemployment  rate.  Independent  of  the  role  of  other 
institutions,  good  industrial  relations  do  seem  to  matter:  greater  strike  volume  is 
associated with higher unemployment. But these results apply in cross section. Holding 
country effects constant, the sign of the strikes coefficient is abruptly reversed.  Although 
it does not seem to be the case that the line of causation runs from unemployment to 
strikes once we control for the endogeneity of strikes, it is also the case that support for 
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I. Introduction 
The argument that the quality of labor relations matters for economic performance is 
widely encountered in the industrial relations literature even if it has proven difficult to 
sustain  in  practice.  The  best  example  is  of  course  the  ambiguous  role  of  workplace 
governance  as  a  determinant  of  workplace  performance.  For  example,  using  British 
WERS data, Fernie and Metcalf (1995) found that authoritarian workplaces performed 
better  on  some  dimensions  of  firm  performance  than  did  the  archetypal  employee 
involvement workplace, while Wood and de Menezes (1998) reported that workplaces 
assessed to have high high commitment management were not more effective than their 
counterparts  with  medium-low,  low-medium,  and  low  levels  of  high  commitment 
management along seven dimensions of work performance. Recent British work on social 
partnership agreements paints a somewhat more optimistic picture, although this may be 
premature (see, respectively, Metcalf, 2003; Kelly, 2004).  
For its part, the U.S. literature has long emphasized the potential of collective 
voice to improve the functioning of internal labor markets (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
This value-enhancing role of (union) collective voice hinges crucially in the model upon 
a  constructive  institutional  response  from  management  and  a  cooperative  industrial 
relations environment. Identification of material pro-productive union effects has proved 
largely  elusive,  however,  which  outcome  may  of  course  reflect  largely  uncooperative 
labor relations in the United States in the last two decades. But, even abstracting from the 
union entity, the U.S. evidence on the impact of employee involvement/high performance 
work  practices  also  provides  very  mixed  results  on  the  effects  of  labor  management 
cooperation (for a review, see Addison, 2005). As in the British case, however, some   4
recent  work  presents  a  more  positive  picture.  Specifically,  analyses  of  strikes  –  long 
treated  as  an  outcome  indicator  rather  than  an  input  –  have  offered  some  interesting 
insights into the quality of industrial relations at the workplace and the effect of the latter 
on productivity (and practices such as TQM) and output quality (see Kleiner et al., 2002; 
Krueger and Mas, 2004).
1                                                                                                                                        
There has been almost no attempt to factor the industrial relations climate into the 
determination of macro outcomes, even if industrial relations processes have not been 
neglected in that literature. Thus, the degree of centralization in collective bargaining 
and, latterly, the extent of coordination of the bargaining parties/process have recently 
been entered alongside (the monopoly arguments of) union coverage and union density as 
determinants of unemployment and employment (see section 2).  
In  the  most  recent  development,  however,  a  measure  of  the  climate  of  labor 
relations  has  been  added  to the growing number of collective bargaining variables in 
macro  analysis.  Specifically,  Blanchard  and  Philippon  (2004)  have  argued  that,  in 
countries where wages are largely determined by collective bargaining, the effects on 
unemployment of changes in the economic environment will depend in large part on the 
speed of learning of unions. The latter is seen as a reflection of the quality of the dialogue 
between the two sides, or the “quality of industrial relations.”  Proxying the latter by 
strike  intensity  (from  1960  to  1967),  they  report  that  countries  with  one  standard 
deviation better quality had about 1 percent less unemployment than the average country 
in  the  first  decade  of  the  sample  period,  rising  to  2-2.5  percent  less  in  the  last  two 
decades.    If  this  result  is  robust  the  authors  have  uncovered  an  important  additional   5
influence of industrial relations – its quality and not just its structure – on a key macro 
indicator.  
The present paper seeks to further examine this intriguing if recherché notion. Our 
innovations  include  the  use  of  annual  strike  data  (and  strike  data  averaged  over  the 
sample  period)  and  the  construction  and  deployment  of  time-varying  institutional 
variables.  Further,  in  order  to  tackle  the  important  issue  of  strike  endogeneity,  we 
supplement our country fixed effects specification with findings from an Arellano-Bond 
(1991) panel estimator. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. We briefly describe the new model and, at 
somewhat greater length, the broader macro-labor literature within which it is embedded. 
Next, we introduce the empirical models and the data used in the present inquiry, before 
presenting our empirical results. A summary and the requirements of a future research 
agenda conclude.   
 
II.  How  the  Quality  of  Industrial  Relations  Might  Matter  and  the  Issue  of 
Implementation  
 
Blanchard and Philippon  (2004, p. 11) argue that the more unions and firms share a 
common  economic  model,  or  the  more  they  discuss  the  economic  implications  of 
different shocks, the faster learning and adjustment is likely to be. Bayesian learning is 
thus  central  to  the  authors’  formal  model,  in  which  the  effects  of  shocks  on 
unemployment depend largely on whether and how fast they are perceived by unions.
2       
 The  authors  link  this  critical  speed  of  union  learning  and  adjustment  to  the 
quality of the dialogue that unions have with firms or, equivalently, with the quality of 
labor relations. The backdrop is the course of unemployment in 18 countries over four   6
decades, 1965-2003.  The quality of industrial relations is proxied by strike intensity in 
the sample period 1960-67, and strike intensity is measured by the maximum of days lost 
and  workers  involved,  both  normalized  by  the  cross  country  standard deviations.
3   In 
practice,  they  also  use  a  second,  direct  measure  based  on  the  survey  responses  on 
managers in large firms; specifically, to a 1999 World Economic Forum question seeking 
to determine the extent to which labor relations in their firms were “cooperative” (on an 
eight point scale from 0 to 7). Since the outcome indicator might be reflected in this 
response,  Blanchard  and  Philippon  ultimately  use  the  1960-67  strikes  measure  to 
instrument for the 1999 survey measure.  
Simple bivariate regressions of unemployment in each of four decades separately 
on the strikes measure and the direct, survey measure (actual and instrumented) indicate a 
strong  and  statistically  significant  effect  of  the  quality  of  industrial  relations  on 
unemployment  –  the  former  positively  and  the  latter  negatively.  But  their  preferred 
specification interacts the measure of the quality of industrial relations with unobservable 
shocks common to the 18 countries in the sample.   
In fact, this indicator of cooperation or the quality of industrial relations is but one 
of  nine  ‘institutional’  variables  in  the  model,  so  that  the  impact  of  a  common 
(unobservable) aggregate shock depends on a linear combination of all nine institutions. 
Apart  from  the  cooperation  measure,  the  other  arguments  are  drawn  from  the 
employment protection literature, which it is instructive to review.  
Arguably  the  main  impetus  behind  the  now  extensive  employment  protection 
literature  was  Lazear’s  (1990)  cross-country  analysis  of  the  determinants  of 
unemployment.
4  Lazear’s  key  argument  is  a  time-varying  measure  of  severance  pay;   7
specifically, the amount of statutory severance pay due to a blue-collar worker with 10 
years of service dismissed for reasons unconnected with his or her behavior. The only 
other independent variables in this sparse empirical representation are a quadratic in time, 
the  growth  in  per  capita  GDP  (to  accommodate  the  notion  that  a  growing  economy 
vitiates  at  least  in  part  the  probabilistic  costs  of  severance  pay),  and  a  demographic 
control (the population of working age). Lazear’s central finding was of course that the 
more generous a country’s severance pay entitlement, the greater its unemployment.   
  Following Lazear, the literature developed in two main directions. First, there was 
search for a more inclusive measure of employment protection than just severance pay. 
This  culminated  in  the  well-known  OECD  (1994)  rankings  of  the  ‘strictness’  of 
employment  protection  legislation  for  regular  contracts  and  fixed-term  contracts  (and 
their  composite).
5 Rankings for 16 countries were derived, pertaining to the “the late 
1980s,” so that the price of inclusiveness was a single data point rather than the time-
varying measure of Lazear.
6  
The second development was the inclusion of a wider range of regressors than 
considered by Lazear. Chief among these variables have been union arguments, aspects 
of  the  unemployment  insurance  (UI)  system,  the  tax  wedge,  and  active  labor  market 
policies. Thus, collective bargaining arguments such as union density and union coverage 
have typically been included on the grounds that they are directly associated with pay, 
and thence unemployment. Additional arguments based on centralization or coordination 
have a very different pedigree. Initially, it was argued that a more centralized bargaining 
framework should lead to improved employment outcomes vis-à-vis a less centralized 
(but  not  totally  decentralized)  system  because  the  disemployment  and  price/tax   8
consequences of excessive wage increases would be more transparent, leading unions to 
take account of the effects of wage increases on all workers (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).    
More  recently,  researchers  have  increasingly  relied  on  the  notion  of  coordination, 
ostensibly  because  the  underlying  model  relies  more  on  behavior  than  the  fact  of 
centralization (e.g. Soskice, 1990; Nickell, 1997; Nickell and Layard, 1999).
7 The spirit 
of the literature is nicely captured in Nickell’s (1997, p. 68) dictum: “[U]nions are bad for 
jobs, but these bad effects can be nullified if both the unions and the employers can 
coordinate their wage bargaining activities.”   
For their part, more generous unemployment benefits lower the opportunity cost 
of unemployment and elevate wage pressure at the same time that they subsidize search. 
The upshot is higher equilibrium unemployment because of lengthened jobless duration. 
Ideally,  the  unemployment  benefits  measure  should  reflect  the  generosity  of  the  UI 
system, including the maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits and any 
prolongation under separate unemployment assistance benefits. Practically, researchers 
have been able to draw on a cross-country summary measure provided by the OECD, 
based on an average of gross replacement rates for individuals with two earnings levels, 
three  family  situations,  and  three  duration  categories  of  unemployment  (for  odd 
numbered years).
8  
Operating alongside unemployment benefits are measures that may have exactly 
the opposite effect on unemployment, namely, active labor market programs, operating 
directly  on  unemployment  by  improving  search  efficiency  and  indirectly  by  reducing 
wage pressure. Equally, they may not, most obviously perhaps where they signal future 
accommodation by the authorities to inflationary wage demands. Expenditures on active   9
labor market policies are typically expressed as a percentage of GDP or as expenditures 
per unemployed individual relative to GDP per capita.
9 
Finally, the tax wedge – the gap between the gross labor costs to employers and 
the consumption wage paid to labor – may have little effect on unemployment because 
the  incidence  may  be  largely  shifted  on  to  labor.  On  the  other  hand,  if  markets  are 
imperfect, there may be no offsetting wage cuts, while formal and implicit wage floors 
(set respectively by minimum wage legislation and social welfare provisions) will make 
labor taxes harmful to low-productivity workers.
 10 
All of the above arguments plus the state of labor relations in 1999, instrumented 
by strikes in the 1960s, are deployed by Blanchard and Philippon in a specification that, 
as  noted  above,  allows  the  impact  of  a  common  (unobservable)  aggregate  shock  to 
depend  on  a  linear  combination  of  all  of  them.  But  note  that  although  time  varying 
information is available on most of these arguments (see, for example, Blanchard and 
Wolfers,  2000)  the  measures  of  employment  protection,  the  UI  replacement  rate,  the 
maximum duration of UI benefits, the tax wedge, active labor market policies, and the 
three collective bargaining indicators are fixed. To repeat, in each case the measures are 
interacted with the  time  dummy  variables  since the maintained hypothesis is that the 
main  route  through  which  institutions  impact  employment  is  how  well  they  mediate 
economic shocks.
11  
With these preliminaries behind us, the more detailed findings of Blanchard and 
Philippon are threefold. First, cooperation in industrial relations in an equation containing 
just the cooperation variable and the three decade-long year dummies is negative and 
well determined. Alternatively put, strikes are positively associated with unemployment.   10
Second, when the other eight institutional regressors are added to the equation, the point 
estimate of cooperation in industrial relations falls somewhat in absolute magnitude but 
remains  highly  significant.  Third,  the  statistically  significant  and  opposing  effects  of 
coordination and union density on unemployment – the former lowering joblessness and 
the latter elevating it – remain well determined. 
 
III. Models and Data 
Let  us  denote  the  key  labor  market  performance  indicator  –  unemployment  –  by  y. 
Assuming  that  countries  in  the  dataset  are  observed  at  different  points  in  time, 
unemployment in country i in period t is then given by yit.  Further assume that in each 
country, at each data point, we observe a set of country-specific labor market institutions, 
Xitj, j=1, 2,…, k;  i=1,2,…, N ; and  t=1, 2, …, T. 
Measuring  how  institutions  impact  labor  market  outcomes  has  typically  been 
addressed in one of two alternative ways. First, it has been assumed that the role of any 
given labor market institution can be captured independently of, or in interaction with, 
other institutions (see, respectively, Nickell, 1997; Belot and van Ours, 2004). Second, 
institutions may be depicted as interacting with shocks, either ameliorating or aggravating 
the impact of adverse exogenous shocks (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). In this latter 
case, the impact of a shock can be modelled as a function of given set of institutions, 
yielding  a  nonlinear  model  in  the  parameters,  whereas  the  former  case  is  linear  by 
definition  and  can  be  estimated  using  standard  OLS  techniques.  Within  these  two 
approaches,  the present paper assembles a new set of time-varying institutions, while 
inserting a new institution: the quality of labor relations.    11
Formally, let us first consider the following empirical model
12 
       it i it it u c X y + + = b ,                      (1) 
where  Xit  includes  all  the  relevant  labor  market  institutions,  ci  is  the  cross-section 
unobserved  effect  (or  unobserved  country  heterogeneity),  and  uit  is  the  idiosyncratic 
error, or disturbance, term, with E(ut |Xt, c) = 0. For convenience, further assume that Xit 
contains both time-invariant and time-varying variables. Calendar time dummies can also 
be added to the model, as well as interactions between institutions. This model is linear in 
the parameters and the evaluation exercise will consist in obtaining an estimate ofb . 
Obvious candidates are, respectively, the pooled OLS, fixed-effects, and random-effects 
estimators  OLS b ˆ ,  FE b ˆ , and  RE b ˆ . In the spirit of Blanchard and Philippon (2004), who 
divided the 1965-2003 period in longer time intervals than a year to avoid contamination 
from cyclical fluctuations, and if we for the moment neglect the fixed effects case by 
noting that the data are thin (occasioned by a short sample period – a maximum of six 5-
year intervals  – and modest changes in institutions through time), the main option is 
random effects (in the linear version of model (1)). This assumes that all cross-section 
heterogeneity will be picked up by the array of institutions, and that the unobserved effect 
ci is uncorrelated with the observed j labor market institutions. However, results from 
fitting the standard pooled OLS model will be used to provide a set of initial estimates.
13 
In this context, and again in the spirit of Blanchard and Philippon, we will also report 
results from a simpler exercise regressing the outcome variable (unemployment) on our 
indicator(s) of the quality of industrial relations in separate cross sections for each of the 
5-year intervals making up our sample period.   12
   Within the framework of model (1), the course of unemployment yit is explained 
by  either  changes  in  the  Xj  institutions  or  changes  in common  across-country  shocks 
(proxied by time dummies). Since within country changes in institutions may not be well 
suited  to  explain  differences  in  outcomes  across  time  because  of  the  persistence  of 
institutions  (and  common  across-country  shocks  cannot  of  course  explain  differences 
between countries), it is worthwhile trying to experiment with the interaction between 
shocks and institutions in order to capture differences in labor market performance. The 
possibility that ‘unfavorable’ institutions only reveal their true nature under adverse states 
of nature requires a different modelling strategy, however, which can be translated into 




j itj t T t t it u b X dT d y + + + + + = ∑
=1
2 1 ) 1 )( ... 2 ( q q q ,           (2) 
where the variables  t t dT d ,..., 2  denote time period dummies so that  1 = t ds  if s=t. (These 
variables are proxies for the unobserved common across-country shocks.) As in equation 
(1), the variables Xj can represent both time-invariant and time-varying institutions. The 
model does not include any country dummies. Nor does it allow for the ‘autonomous’ 
impact of institution j on yit. Rather, by specifying the impact of the time-specific shocks, 
T s dst ,.., 1 , = , as a function of a linear combination of institutions, ∑j j itjb X , the model 
concentrates fully on whether, say, a negative shock (one that increases unemployment) 
translates into more unemployment due the presence of institution j. Under model (2), 
therefore, if bj is positive and a given economy is hit by an adverse shock, then institution 
j  ‘creates’  more  unemployment.  Correspondingly,  if  bj  is  negative,  then  institution  j   13
insulates  the  economy  from  any  adverse  shock,  or  at  least  softens  its  impact.  Again, 
estimation on the model requires nonlinear techniques.
14  
Subject – to the caveats entered earlier, we will also examine models (1) and (2) 
in a fixed-effects framework, which for model (2) – the NLS case – amounts to simply 
adding  country  dummies.    In  the  light  of  the  potential  endogeneity  of  strikes,  the 
Arellano-Bond panel estimator will be implemented as well. In this case, the procedure 
involves  both  differecing  (to  eliminate  the  unobserved  time-invariant  country-specific 
effect)  and  instrumental  variables  (to  solve  for  any  feedback  effect  between  the 
unemployment rate and strikes). Thus, setting  ) , ( it it it w Z X º , where Zit is a vector of 
strictly  exogenous  variables,  while  wit  contains  a  lagged  dependent  variable,  first 
differencing of model (1) yields: 
it it it u X y D + D = D b ,                  (3) 
or, in the one lagged dependent variable case, 
it it it it u y Z y D + D + W D = D -1 d .               (3’) 
If we further assume that Zit is strictly exogenous (i.e. 0 ) ( = is itu Z E  for all s and t), then 
the  set  of  valid  instruments  for  the  lagged  dependent  term 1 - D it y   at  time  t  can  be 
represented  by ) ,..., , ( 1 3 2 it it it y y y - - .  Finally,  if  0 ) ( = is itu w E   for  all  s>t  and  where  (by 
reason  of  omitted  variables,  measurement  error  or  simultaneity  between  yit  and 
wit) 0 ) ( ¹ it itu w E   for  all  t s £ ,  then  w  is  no  longer  endogenous  and  will  need  to  be 
instrumented. A valid set of instruments is  ) ,..., ( 1 1 i it w w -  if there are no lagged wit terms – 
or  ) ,..., , ,..., ( 1 2 1 1 i it i it y y w w - - , for example, for the one lagged dependent variable case.  
Our  database  contains  six  time-varying  institutional  indicators  (and  two 
alternative measures of the quality of labor relations) for 19 OECD countries: Australia, 
Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United   14
Kingdom,  and  the  United  States.  As  we  have  seen,  the  conventional  labor  market 
institutional variables are severance pay, the unemployment insurance replacement rate, 
union density, union coverage, union and employer coordination, and the tax wedge. (The 
absence of active labor market policies and benefit duration from this list is explained by 
the lack of time-series data for these arguments.)  The manner in which we obtain six 5-
year  averages  for  each  variable  is  outlined  in  Appendix  Table  1.  The  variables  are 
defined in such a way that an increase in a particular measure is expected to increase 
unemployment, which means in particular that the coordination measure is multiplied by 
-1.  Table  1  provides  the  corresponding  country  means,  with  the  sample  period  being 
divided into six 5-year periods from 1970-99 (namely, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-
99, 1990-1994, and 1995-99).  
(Table 1 near here) 
         We will use two proxies for the quality of labor relations. Our main measure is the 
strike rate (or ‘strike volume’ as it is sometimes known), namely, the number of days not 
worked  per  thousand  paid  employees.  This  ratio  is  based  on  revisions  to  the  raw 
International  Labor  Office  series  on  strikes  (contained  in  the  Yearbook  of  Labor 
Statistics, Tables 9A-D) kindly made available by Claus Schnabel of the University of 
Erlangen-Nürnberg. The data is available on an annual basis and is grouped here into 5-
year  averages.  Our  second  proxy  is  a  direct,  survey-based  indicator  of  the  quality  of 
industrial relations. It is taken from the World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000, published 
by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), Switzerland. In the 
IMD survey, national respondents are asked to rate the state of industrial relations on a 
scale ranging from 1 (“hostile”) to 10 (“productive”).  Unlike the indirect measure of the   15
quality of industrial relations, this indicator is solely time invariant – since publication of 
the IMD index started only in 1989.  
 (Figure 1 near here) 
          Figure 1 charts the course of the strike rate/volume over time for all countries in 
the sample, again for 5-year intervals. Although there is a considerable decrease in strike 
activity  over  time,  it  is  also  the  case  that  countries  show  stability  in  their  relative 
positions.  Taking  all  possible  combinations  between  5-year  periods  (15  in  total),  the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients always exceed 0.8, other than for those involving 
the last five-year interval, where the estimates fall in 0.5-0.7 range.  
 
IV. Findings 
Estimates of a simple model in which the dependent variable (unemployment) is solely a 
function of the selected measure of the quality of labor relations (respectively, ‘strike 
rate’ and ‘cooperation’) is given in Table 2 for six separate cross sections of the data. In 
the first row of the table, the strikes measure assumes a different value for each 5-year 
period. In the second row, however, the direct reputational (i.e. survey) measure is fixed 
at its 2000 reported value throughout, so that only the unemployment rate changes. Since 
the course of unemployment over the period may influence the perceptions of survey 
respondents as to the quality of industrial relations (in 2000), we also instrumented the 
IMD index by the observed strike rate/volume in the 70s, 80s, and early 90s (the third 
row). 
(Table 2 near here)   16
We find that greater strike volume is associated with heightened unemployment, 
while the direct survey measure(s) of the quality of labor relations is associated with 
reduced joblessness. Note that these results accord with those reported by Blanchard and 
Philippon (2005, Table 1). As can be seen, most of the coefficient estimates are well 
determined, with the main exception of that for the indirect measure in the most recent 5-
year interval. (The same broad findings hold when we ran separate regressions by decade 
using two clouds of data for each decade.)
15 Alternatively, and taking into account the 
(sample) standard deviation, we note that the estimated coefficients imply that countries 
with one standard deviation better quality labor relations have 0.8 to 2.9 percent less 
unemployment. 
(Table 3 near here) 
Table 3 provides results from using all of our labor market indicators and for the 
full sample period, 1970-99. Separate results are given for the strikes proxy and for the 
direct measure of the quality of industrial relations. Note that the two measures of labor 
quality are time invariant, strikes being set at their average value over the six 5-year 
periods  (although  this  restriction  will  subsequently  be  relaxed),  while  all  other  labor 
market institutions are time-varying. For the pooled OLS estimates it can be seen that the 
strike rate is positively associated with unemployment and the survey measure (of the 
degree  of  cooperation  in  industrial  relations)  is  negatively  associated  with 
unemployment. (The impact of one standard deviation better quality on unemployment is 
in  the  same  range  as  reported  above  in  Table  2.)  The  coefficient  estimates  for  both 
arguments are well determined. Of the other institutional influences, the effects of higher 
replacement rates and greater coordination in collective bargaining are as expected (recall   17
that  the  coordination  score  has  been  multiplied  by  -1)  and  the  respective  coefficient 
estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels. But observe that, although the 
effect of higher levels of union coverage (one of the two monopoly union arguments) is 
of the expected sign, this is not the case for the other monopoly union measure. 
The  estimates  reported  in  columns  (1)  through  (3)  of  Table  3  assume  away 
unobserved cross-country heterogeneity. Since application of the standard Breusch-Pagan 
test rejected the null of constant variance of the error term (homoskedasticity), we re-
estimated the base model using random effects. The GLS estimates provided in the next 
three columns of the table again support the prior that good industrial relations matter: the 
coefficients on the strike and reputation measures are of the expected sign and remain 
well determined. The performance of the labor-market institutions proper also improves 
somewhat, although the perverse effects of union density persist. 
The estimates in the last three columns of Table 3 return us to the nonlinear model 
of equation (2). As can be seen, the effect of the labor market institutions proper further 
strengthens. And again the two measures of the industrial relations climate operate in the 
hypothesized manner, with strikes adversely impacting the effect of negative shocks and 
cooperation in industrial relations ameliorating them. 
(Table 4 near here) 
Table 4 repeats the regressions in columns (2), (5) and (8) of Table 3, substituting 
the 5-year, time-varying strikes measure for the measure in which strikes are averaged 
over  the  six  5-year  periods.  It  can  be  seen  that  the  coefficient  estimate  for  strike 
rate/volume is no longer statistically significant in the random effects GLS specification 
but remains well determined in the NLS estimates in column (3) of the table).    18
(Table 5 near here) 
Thus far, our results support the notion that good industrial relations – proxied 
inversely  by  strike  volume  and  directly  via  a  reputation  measure  of  the  degree  of 
cooperation  in  industrial  relations  –  do  matter  in  influencing  unemployment,  either 
independently or taken in conjunction with economic shocks. In Table 5, we investigate 
whether or not the above relationships still hold when we control for country effects. In 
the first column of the table, we provide fixed effects estimates of the basic model, and in 
second column we add country dummies to the (NLS) specification in which institutions 
interact with shocks. The changes in the results are quite dramatic: the strike rate remains 
highly  statistically  significant  but  its  sign  is  reversed,  with  strike  volume  now  being 
negatively  associated  with  unemployment.  (Also  the  performance  of  the  institutional 
variables deteriorates vis-à-vis the results in Tables 3 and 4.)  
It is tempting to argue that the cross-section results reported earlier pick up long-
run influences while the within estimator provides evidence of the (pro)cyclical nature of 
strikes reported in the strikes literature proper (see, inter al., Ashenfelter and Johnson, 
1969; Hirsh and Addison, 1987; Cramton and Tracy, 2003). An immediate caveat is of 
course  that  the  strikes  measure  in  the  present  study is a  conflation  of  frequency  and 
duration, and it may be the case that strike duration is countercyclical – although contrary 
evidence, at least for large strikes, is provided by Harrison and Stewart (1993). 
  However, reverse causation requires that we find some instrument for the strikes 
series. One ambitious approach for the future might be directly to look for changes in 
labor  law  or  in  the  rules  governing  collective  bargaining.  Here,  we  instead  opt  to 
implement the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator in which tackling endogeneity involves   19
differencing combined with instrumental variables methods: differencing to get rid of  the 
unobserved time-invariant country-specific effect and instrumental variables to solve for 
the  feedback  effect  between  the  unemployment  rate  and  strikes.  Observe  that  the 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator has the property of using lagged levels of the endogenous 
variables as valid instruments for the endogenous regressors, which is of considerable 
advantage  here  because  of  the  singular  difficulty  of  finding  a  variable  that  is 
simultaneously correlated with strikes but uncorrelated with unemployment. 
Thus far, we have used six 5-year periods, 1970-74 to 1995-99. In order to control 
for the endogeneity of strikes, we decided to expand the panel by using annual data on 
the same set of countries. Further, use of annual data makes our results more comparable 
with the most recent literature on job protection (e.g. Nickell et al., 2005, and Belot and 
van  Ours,  2004).  Also  in   line  with this literature, we decided to introduce a lagged 
dependent term into the model and add a number of baseline (observed shocks) variables.  
(Table 6 near here) 
The results of our implementation of Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimator are 
shown  in  Table  6.  As  mentioned,  we  are  using  annual  observations,  and  they  were 
obtained by using our raw annual data (or by simple interpolation if no annual data is 
available).  Annual baseline variables – the real interest rate, real import prices, labor 
demand shocks, total factor productivity shocks, and money supply shocks – were taken 
from  Nickell  et  al.  (2005) and  cover  the  period  1970-1995.  The  model  includes  two 
lagged dependent variables and the instruments used are lagged endogenous variables. 
(Models  with  two  lagged  dependent  variables  tend  to  perform  better  in  terms  of  the 
relevant  statistical  tests.)   The  table  also  includes  the  tests  on  first  and  second  order   20
autocorrelation in the first differenced errors,  it u D .
16  Under homoskedasticity, the null 
hypothesis  that  the  overidentifying  restrictions  are  valid  should  not  be  rejected  (the 
Sargan  test).  The  Wald  statistic  tests  the  null  hypothesis  that  all  the  coefficients 
(excluding the time dummies) are zero. 
The  most  striking  result  from  Table  6  is  that  the  strikes  variable,  while  still 
evincing a negative sign in columns (1) and (2), is no longer statistically significant. (In 
column (3), the sign of the coefficient is positive but again not precisely determined.) In 
other words, after taking first differences to control for unobserved country heterogeneity 
and controlling for the endogeneity of strikes, the role of industrial relations quality is no 
longer evident in the data. 
It is true that we are now dealing with a different type of setting – Table 6 uses 
annual  observations  and  data  on  observed  shocks  (viz.  aggregate  demand  shocks, 
produtivity  shocks,  and  wage  shocks) – but this new framework if anything provides 
improved  precision  as  regards  the  role  of  the  other  institutional  variables.  Thus,  the 
severance  pay,  replacement  rate,and  union  density  arguments  are  all  statistically 
significant (pace Table 5, column (1)).
17  
Diagnostic tests in columns (1) through (3) perform as expected; in particular, the 
null of both the Sargan and m2 tests is not rejected. The coefficients of all shocks or 
baseline variables also have the expected sign and conform closely with those reported by 
Nickell  et  al.  (2005,  Table  5):  specifically,  (positive)  labor  demand  and  productivity 
shocks impact unemployment negatively, while (positive) money supply and real import 
price shocks and higher real (long-term) interest rate generate higher unemployment. In a   21
different experiment, again not reported in the table, we smoothed the strikes series using 




In an important departure, it has recently been argued that what is good for industrial 
relations might after all be good for performance, this time at the macro level. Suggesting 
that the quality of industrial relations might be (inversely) proxied by strikes, Blanchard 
and Philippon (2004) adduce strong support for their claim that ‘quality’ matters in an 
analysis of unemployment determination in 18 OECD countries, 1965-2003. Thus, for 
example, they report that countries with one standard deviation better industrial relations 
enjoyed 2 to 2.5 percent lower unemployment over the course of the last two decades. 
Moreover, they argue that this quality effect is available over and above any structural 
benefits provided by union and employer coordination in collective bargaining. 
In the present treatment, we further investigated the quality issue. Our innovations 
in  ascending  order  of  importance  were  the  derivation  of  a  direct  moment-in-time 
indicator of labor relations quality supported by different survey data, the use of annual 
strike  data  (and  strike  data  averaged  over  the  sample  period  rather  than  being  set  at 
beginning-of-period values or indeed earlier) as well as the construction and deployment 
of other time-varying institutional variables, and finally the use of instrumental variables.  
To  begin  with,  the  Blanchard-Philippon  hypothesis  held  up  really  rather  well. 
That  is  to  say,  higher  strike  volume  averaged  over  the  sample  period  and  greater 
cooperation in industrial relations at end of period were found to be related to the macro 
performance indicator in the manner these authors hypothesized. And although allowing   22
strike volume to vary through time – and for other institutional innovations – weakened 
the Blanchard-Philippon result they did not overturn it. 
The  fly  in  the  ointment  first  became  apparent  when  we  deployed  the  within 
estimator. With the introduction of country dummies, the sign of the relation between 
strikes  and  unemployment  abruptly  reversed  itself:  higher  strike  activity  was  now 
associated with lower unemployment.  At first blush, and drawing on the micro strikes 
literature, this result might be interpreted as reflecting cyclical influences, with the results 
in cross section picking up long-run influences. But what the result really indicated was 
the need to squarely address the causation issue. To this end, we further deployed the 
Arellano-Bond panel estimator, using instrumental variables to solve for the feedback 
effect between the unemployment rate and strike volume. The result was that the strike 
argument lost significance. 
We  conclude  that  in  the  absence  of  measurement  error  (and  see  Hauk  and 
Wacziarg,  2004,  for  the  superiority  of  the  simple  between  estimator  in  such 
circumstances)  the  importance  of  trust  between  capital  and  labor  has  yet  to  be 
substantiated in the macro literature (no less than in the micro literature). That said, the 
rejection of measurement error is heroic when dealing with strikes and other institutional 
data and we would of course have preferred to use a more direct instrument (e.g. changes 
in labor law or the rules governing collective bargaining such as those engineered in 
Britain by Mrs. Thatcher in the 1980s) than the lagged values approach. According, our 
rejection of the recherché notion industrial relations quality matter is perforce tentative. 
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Endnotes 
1. Strikes are of course not the only measure of industrial relations quality/performance. 
Another might be grievances. Two early studies of General Motors plants and of ten 
paper mills found that the number of grievances was inversely related to productivity 
(see, respectively, Katz et al., 1983; Ichniowski, 1984). A review of the earlier literature 
on the relationship between labor-management conflict and firm performance is provided 
by Belman (1992).   
2.  The  model  assumes  an  economy-wide  union  acting  as  a  monopoly and seeking to 
maximize the wage bill period by period subject to a perceived labor demand. The actual 
labor demand is derived on the basis of a specific aggregate production function and a 
particular  supply  of  capital  function.  The  union  is  depicted  as  choosing  the  wage 
unilaterally on the basis of its perceptions of the parameters of the demand function. The 
level of employment is then set by firms on the basis of the actual demand schedule. If 
the union’s perceptions are correct, it follows that the economy will proceed along a 
balanced growth path where capital, output, and real wages grow in line with productivity 
and employment holds constant. Now, imposing a negative shock to productivity growth, 
employment will only remain constant if union perceptions adjust fully and wages adjust 
appropriately. If perceptions do not fully adjust, perceived productivity will exceed actual 
productivity  and  employment will  be lower  until  the  expected  productivity converges 
back to actual productivity. Assuming stochastic productivity – where actual productivity 
equals  underlying  productivity  plus  white  noise  and  where  underlying  productivity 
growth  can  either  be positive  or zero  –  unions  will learn  and  adjust  wages at a  rate 
according  to  the  tightness  of  their  prior  and  the  standard  deviation  of  the  transitory 
component.  The  authors  simulate  one  such  path  of  wage  (and  hence  employment) 
adjustment for two such values and an assumed fall in underlying total factor productivity 
growth from 1 percent to 0 percent. For the parameters chosen it takes around seven years 
for employment to return to its pre-shock value. 
3. The use of the max specification is justified on the grounds that both measures are 
likely to be lower bounds on strike activity. 
4. Lazear also examines the employment-population ratio, the labor force participation 
rate, and average hours worked, using the same regressors.   24
5. The regular contracts component included not only months of severance pay for no-
fault  dismissals  but  also  procedural  delays  and  other  complications  (such  as  prior 
authorization)  before  notice  could  be activated,  as well  as  the  perceived difficulty  of 
dismissal as indexed by the legal conditions defining ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ dismissals (trial 
periods,  compensation  payable,  and  extent  of  reinstatement).  The  fixed-term  contract 
component  included  the  objective  grounds  for  entering  into  such  employment 
relationships  (and  permitted  derogations),  together  with  the  maximum  number  of 
successive contracts and their maximum cumulated duration. 
6.  The  OECD  (1999)  subsequently  revised  its  overall  and  component  measures  of 
employment protection for “the late 1990s,” thus providing researchers with two data 
points – and for a modestly enlarged sample of 19 countries. Note that other indicators of 
employment  protection  are  available  from  surveys  of  employers  (see  for  example  Di 
Tella and MacCulloch, 1999). 
7.  Other  analysts  have  deployed  both  centralization  and  coordination  regressors  (see 
Scarpetta, 1996; Elmeskov et al., 1998; OECD, 1999). 
8. There is unfortunately no parallel time series information on the maximum duration of 
unemployment benefits. 
9. Since spending on active measures is endogenous it is conventional to characterize the 
variable  as  a  fixed  effect,  instrumenting  it  by  the  average  spending  over  the  sample 
period.  
10. If the upshot of these post-Lazear innovations is mixed with respect to the impact of 
employment protection on unemployment (see Addison and Teixeira, 2003, pp.105-107), 
there is some agreement on the effect of the structure of collective bargaining and several 
of the other arguments. Thus, most studies report that increased coordination is associated 
with  lower  unemployment,  either  independently  or  in  conjunction  with  employment 
protection and adverse shocks (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997; Elmeskov et al., 1998; 
Nickell and Layard, 1999; OECD, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000), while greater 
union coverage and higher union density are often associated with greater unemployment, 
although the relationships are often weak.  
11. Note that all measures of labor market institutions are defined such that an increase in 
the measure is expected to increase the effect of an adverse shock, requiring in the case of   25
active labor market policies and degree of coordination that the measures are multiplied 
by -1.  
12. This general specification can be designated as an Unobserved Effects Model (UEM) 
(Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 10). 
13. Pooled OLS assumes away unobserved effects ci. Under the assumption that E(Xit ci) 
= 0, the pooled OLS estimator is consistent but the error term will be serially correlated 
due to the presence of the time-invariant component ci. Inference based on pooled OLS 
will then require robust standard errors. The random effects implementation of model (1) 
assumes E(Xit ci) = 0 and exploits the serial correlation in the composite error, eit=ci+uit, 
in a generalized least squares (GLS) framework. 






E * ) , | ( q =
¶
¶
, for a given year s, s = 1, 2, …, T. 
15. The point estimate of the strikes measure was strongly statistically significant in the 
1970s and 1990s, although not the 1980s, while the coefficients for the direct measures 
were well determined throughout. 
16. it u D is necessarily second order serially uncorrelated, otherwise the GMM estimator is 
not consistent. In other words, E( 0 ) 2 = D D - it it u u  is required. 
17. The fixed effects case in Table 5 with annual observations generates virtually the 
same coefficient statistical significance. 
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Table 1: Unemployment and Labor Market Institutions (Country Means, 1970-99) 
 
(1)  (2)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6  (7) 
















Australia  0.067  20.7  3  45.4  29  1.9  1  369.4  6.2 
Austria  0.029  27.7  3  54.1  54.1  3  2.1  5.6  7.7 
Belgium  0.082  43.0  3  51.3  59.7  2  0  143.1  5.9 
Denmark  0.064  46.7  3  69.8  62.7  2.3  0  202.4  7.9 
Finland  0.068  23.0  3  66.0  53.7  2  0  396.1  7.4 
France  0.080  30.3  3  16.6  54.7  2  0.9  160.6  4.4 
Germany  0.058  28.7  3  33.3  54.0  3  0  30.0  6.7 
Ireland  0.112  24.7  3  53.2  52.0  2  1.4  418.9  7.3 
Italy  0.092  2.0  3  41.4  54.7  1.7  7.0  764.0  5.0 
Japan  0.024  10.0  1  30.2  24.3  3  0  45.5  7.6 
The Netherlands  0.065  49.0  3  33.0  56.0  2  0  25.6  8.2 
New Zealand  0.043  26.7  1.8  46.8  35.0  1.3  3.3  321.6  7.1 
Norway  0.032  24.3  3  55.1  62.3  2.5  0  75.2  7.7 
Portugal  0.059  14.3  3  51.3  41.0  2  7.9  97.2  6.2 
Spain  0.141  24.3  3  17.5  43.0  2  5.8  581.2  5.4 
Switzerland  0.013  12.0  2  29.4  39.3  2  0  1.3  8.6 
Sweden  0.039  19.7  3  78.2  60.3  2.3  0  92.4  7.8 
United Kingdom  0.070  22.3  2.7  43.8  45.3  1.3  2.5  310.8  7.0 
United States  0.064  12.3  1  20.4  36  1  0  223.6  6.6 
Sources: The material in columns (1) through (5) is based on the definitions in Appendix Table 1; severance pay in column (6) is based on the Lazear (1990) measure; data on 
strike volume in column (7) was kindly provided by Claus Schnabel of the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg; and the index of cooperation in industrial relations, also in column 
(7), was taken from The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000 (International Institute for Management Development, Switzerland).   31
Table  2:  Unemployment  and  the  Quality  of  Labor  Relations,  Separate  Cross-Section 
Regressions  (six  5-year  periods,  1970-74,  1975-79,  1980-84,  1985-89,  1990-94,  and 
1995-99).  
(Dependent variable: unemployment rate. The quality of labor relations is proxied by the 
strike rate/volume and by the IMD index of cooperation in industrial relations.) 
 
Time period   
 1970-74  1975-79  1980-
1984 

































































Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
Notes: The general model specification is given by  yi = a + bxi + ei, where the dependent 
variable, unemployment (yi), is simply a function of the selected index of the quality of 
labor relations (xi). In row 3 the IMD index was instrumented by the observed strike 
volume in the 70s, 80s, and early 90s. The number of countries in the sample is 19 (18 in 
1970-74, row 1).  
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Table 3: Unemployment and the Quality of Labor Relations, 1970-99, 5-Year Averages. 
(Dependent variable: unemployment rate. The quality of labor relations is proxied by the 
strike rate/volume and by the IMD index of cooperation in industrial relations.)  
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(0.0026) 
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(0.0004) 
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(0.0004) 









































  (0.0056) 
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(0.0074) 



































0.00008    
(0.0003) 















(over time average) 
 
  0.00009 
(0.00003) 
    0.00009 
(0.00003) 






    -0.0093    
(0.0036) 
    -0.0116 
(0.0050) 
    -0.1616 
(0.0620) 
R
2  0.56  0.66  0.59  0.55  0.66  0.58  0.60  0.72  0.63 
Wald c
2        106.5  121.05  134.38       
F  14.95  41.0  13.37        10.74  16.85  11.25 
N  92  92  92  92  92  92  92  92  92 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: The general specification of the model in columns (1)-(6) is given by equation (1) in the 
text, while in columns (7)-(9) it is given by equation (2). Sources and definitions of labor market 
institutions are given in Appendix Table 1. The sample period contains six 5-year data points, 
ranging from 1970-74 to 1995-99, and (a maximum of) nineteen countries (unbalanced panel). 
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Table 4: Unemployment and the Quality of Labor Relations, 1970-99, 5-year Averages. 
(Dependent variable: unemployment rate. The quality of labor relations is proxied by the 
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(NLS) 
 





















































2  0.57     
Wald c
2    0.55  0.61 
F  21.23  109.3  10.20 
N  91  91  91 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. 
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Table 5: Unemployment and the Quality of Labor Relations, 1970-99, 5-year Averages, 
Fixed  Effects,  Nonlinear  Least  Squares  with  Country  Dummies,  and  Between Effects 
Estimation.  
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R
2  0.62    0.86  0.85 
F  7.53   14.16  6.43 
N  91  91  19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: The general specification of the model in column (1) is given by equation (1) in the text, 
while in column (2) it is given by equation (2), with country dummies added to the specification. 
Column (3) presents the between effects estimation. Sources and definitions of labor market 
institutions are given in Appendix Table 1. The sample period comprises six 5-year data points, 
from 1970-74 to 1995-99, and (a maximum of) nineteen countries (unbalanced panel).   35
Table  6:  Unemployment  and  the  Quality  of  Labor  Relations,  1970-95,  Annual  Data, 
Arellano-Bond GMM Estimator.  
(Dependent variable: unemployment rate.) 
  
First Differences   First Differences Plus 
Instrumenting Strikes    
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Baseline variables  Yes  No  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald χ
2  2223.41  2036.31  2694.94 
m1  -8.19  -8.24  -8.26 
m2  -0.12  -0.20  -0.13 
Sargan  240.65   304.96   271.23 
N  323  333  323 
Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity in 
parentheses. 
Notes: The general specification of the model is given by equation (3). The model includes two 
lagged dependent variables and, in columns (1) and (3), five baseline variables (the real interest 
rate, real import prices, labor demand shocks, total factor productivity shocks, and money supply 
shocks), taken from Nickell et al. (2005). In columns (2) and (3) the strikes rate/volume is taken 
as  an  endogenous  variable.    Instruments  used  for  the  endogenous  regressors  are  lagged 
endogenous variables. m1 and m2 are first and second order autocorrelation tests in the first-
differenced  residuals.  Under  homoskedasticity,  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  overidentifying 
restrictions  are  valid  cannot  be  rejected  (the  Sargan  test).  The  Wald  statistic  tests  the  null 
hypothesis that all the coefficients (excluding the time dummies) are zero. Sources and definitions 
of the labor market institutions are given in Appendix Table 1. The sample period comprises 
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Appendix Table 1: Description of Institutional Variables  
Variable/source 
Definition/range  Raw year/period  Interpolated periods 
Employment protection (EPL)  Fixed measure (OECD, 1994, 
Table 6.7). 
Ranking of employment protection legislation by “strictness”. It is 
an average country ranking based on four different indicators, 
where 1 denotes the least rigidity. 
1985-93  1970-99, five-year periods. 
1971  1970-74; 1975-79 
1981  1980-84; 1985-89 
Time-varying (OECD, 1994, Table 
8.B.1). 
Summary measure of benefit entitlements on a gross basis. 
1991  1990-94; 1995-99 
Replacement rate (unemployment 
insurance replacement rate) (UIRR) 
 
 
Fixed measure (*) 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
Share of past earnings replaced by unemployment benefits.  1983-88 and 1989-94  1970-99, five-year periods. 
 
1970  1970-74; 1975-79 
1980  1980-84; 1985-89 
1990  1990-94 
Time-varying measure (OECD, 
1997, Table 3.3). 
Trade union density. 
1994  1995-99 
Union density (UDEN) 
Fixed measure (*) 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000. 
Trade union density.  1983-88 and 1989-94  1970-99, five-year periods. 
 
1980  1970-74; 1975-79; 1980-84; 
1985-89 
Time-varying measure (OECD, 
1997, Table 3.3). 
1990  1990-94 
1994  1995-99 
Union coverage (UCOV) 
 
 
  Fixed measure (*) 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000. 
Share of workers covered by union bargaining: 1 denotes less than 
25 percent; 2 means from 25 to 75 percent; and 3 indicates over 70 
percent. 
1983-88 and 1989-94  1970-99, five-year periods. 
1980  1970-74; 1975-79; 1980-84; 
1985-89 
1990  1990-94 
Time-varying measure (OECD, 
1997, Table 3.3). 
Employer and union coordination in bargaining. It is assigned a 
value of 1 if there is no economy-wide coordination/centralization 
up to 3 if the degree of coordination/centralization is very high. 
1994  1995-99 




Fixed measure (*) 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000. 
Employer and employee coordination in bargaining. It is coded  
between 2 and 6 in ascending order (the sum of employer and 
employee coordination). 
1983-88 and 1989-94  1970-99, five-year periods. 
 
1978  1970-74; 1975-79 
1985  1980-84; 1985-89 
Time-varying measure (OECD, 
1997, Table 25). 
Overall tax wedge (in percentage of average production worker 
earnings). 
1994  1990-94; 1995-99 
Tax wedge (TXWEDGE) 
Fixed measure (*) 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000. 
Tax burden. It is measured as the sum of the average payroll, 
income, and consumption tax rates. 
1983-88 and 1989-94  1970-99, five-year periods. 
 
Notes: The data on the fixed measures denoted by * was downloaded from http://www.mit.edu/blanchar/www.articles.html. Blanchard 
and Wolfers (2000) take a  simple average of Nickell’s (1997) original data over two periods, 1983-88 and 1989-94. Time-varying 
measures based on authors’ own calculations.   
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Notes:  Strike  rate/volume  is  given  by  the  ratio  of  days  not  worked  per  thousand  paid 
employees. The raw annual data on strikes is based on a revised version of the ILO series 
(Yearbook of Labor Statistics, Tables 9A-D), kindly made available by Claus Schnabel. The 
height of each column gives the average strike rate over five years for each of the six 5-year 
periods in the sample, beginning with 1970-74 and ending with 1995-99. 
 
 
  
 
 
 